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ABSTRACT 
Rapid growth in dairy consumption and food scandals in India in the 2000s increased awareness of food safety 
issues among consumers and policymakers. This led to the introduction of new standards. However, there is li ttle 
information about how they affected farm-level activities and whether value chains played any role. Our paper 
addresses these questions using a two-round panel survey of dairy farms in Punjab and Andhra Pradesh. We find 
significant improvements in adoption of farm-level hygienic practices, especially in Punjab. Value chain innovations 
do not play a significant role in stimulating safety and quality improvements among dairy smallholders in India.  
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1 Introduction 
Domestic public and private food safety standards are emerging in developing countries, with broad 
implications for smallholder farmers and supply chain development. While many recent studies have 
analyzed the effects of international food standards on farmers and supply chains in developing countries, 
little attention has been paid to domestic standards within developing countries.  
India is therefore an interesting and relevant case for studying the emergence of food standar ds and their 
effects on value chains. India’s Operation Flood program, launched in 1970, transformed the country into 
one of the largest producers of milk in the world. Today, dairy provides jobs for more than 70 million 
households. In recent years, incomes in India have been growing rapidly, creating strong growth in 
demand for milk products. Rapid urbanization and the spread of modern retail have contributed to a push 
for high quality and safety standards (Minten and Reardon, 2008; Reardon and Timmer, 2014). 
A series of food scandals in India in the early 2000s increased national awareness of safety concerns in the 
production, processing and marketing of food. This led to the introduction of the Food Safety and 
Standards Act (FSSA) in 2006, and the establishment of the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India 
(FSSAI) in 2008. It was expected that the combination of new FSSA regulations and increased demand for 
higher quality standards would transform India’s dairy sector; new liability imposed on milk processors 
and traders, in combination with the new microbiological requirements for milk and milk products, would 
create incentives for supply chain reorganization and the emergence of complementary private standards; 
and stronger vertical links with milk producers would be created to better control milk production and 
quality.  
There is very little evidence on this subject and it remains unclear whether new public regulations in the 
Indian dairy sector triggered any changes in the relationships between dairy companies/traders and their 
suppliers and, as such, affected farm-level activities. We fill this gap by using unique farm-level survey 
data from before (2008 and 2010) and after (2015 and 2016) the implementation of the FSSA regulations 
in two different but important milk producing regions of India (Punjab and Andhra Pradesh). This paper 
pursues a twofold objective: (1) to document farm-level changes in food safety practices in the Indian 
dairy sector; and (2) to find out whether value chains influence changes in farm-level practices.  
2 Food standards and dairy value chains  
The FSSA was heavily contested and it took several years before the regulations were published in the 
Indian government gazette (2011) and another year for them to officially go into force (2012). To oversee 
the implementation of the FSSA, the FSSAI was established in 2008. However, India is a large country and 
state-level Food and Drug Administrations (FDAs) often act as the real enforcement bodies. Importantly, 
the new law tried to impose self-regulation by processing companies and traders by specifying which 
actors in the supply chain bear responsibility when food safety regulations are not complied with (Arti cle 
27 of FSSA, 2006) (Shukla et al., 2014). With respect to milk and dairy, milk traders were deemed liable for 
any adulterants (e.g. water, oil, skimmed milk powder, soda) added to the milk, even if the adulteration 1 
was done by their suppliers—unless they could specifically identify the culprit (Squicciarini and Vandeplas, 
2013). The same is true for compliance with microbiological standards. However, a recent audit of the 
FSSA showed that the policy has been implemented poorly (CAG, 2017). Anticipation of proper 
implementation of the legislation—in conjunction with increasing pressure from consumers—may spur 
the emergence of private food standards in the Indian dairy industry. However, it is unclear how far these 
changes have spread along the value chain and to what extent these efforts have affected farm-level 
activities. 
Empirical studies on dairy value chains in other developing and emerging countries have shown that 
increases in demand and the introduction of public regulations may trigger institutional innovations in 
value chains where dairy processors and traders help their farmers satisfy the new standards and 
increasing demand for more quality products (e.g. Dries and Swinnen, 2004; Charlier and Valceschini, 
2010; Geng et al., 2013). Value chains can stimulate or allow improvements in farm-level standards and 
practices that increase milk quality and the safety of dairy products through training, investment support, 
and provision of inputs and information (Bellemare, 2012; Bolwig et al., 2009; Jones and Gibbon, 2011; 
Kumar et al., 2016; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Minten et al., 2009; Dries et al., 2009).  
 
                                                 
1 These regulations in principle also extend to informal traders including street hawkers and itinerant vendors. Opponents 
of the FSSA have argued that poor street vendors are unable to comply with the food standards that have been imposed. 
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Figure 1. Milk procurement structure in Punjab and Andhra Pradesh  
Source: Janssen and Swinnen, 2017 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the dairy supply chains in Punjab and Andhra Pradesh (AP). Informal 
milk markets include direct sales to households or to informal milk traders. Formal markets include 
cooperatives and private dairy companies. In Punjab, private dairy companies are represented by both 
domestic and multinational companies (Nestlé), while in AP there are only domestic private dairy 
companies. Tables 1 and 2 document the importance of the various channels and the changes over time. 
The organization of the value chain in both Punjab and AP allows for close contact between milk buyers 
and dairy farmers and this could serve as a vehicle for information to be distributed at a relatively low 
cost (Janssen and Swinnen, 2017). At the farm level, milk safety and quality can be enhanced by i mproving 
basic hygienic and food safety practices such as washing hands, utensils, and the udders and teats of dairy 
animals (DA) before and during milking (Kumar et al., 2011). Given India’s climatic conditions, timely 
cooling of the milk, storage and preservation practices are essential to guarantee safe milk.  
Table 1. 
Main channels of milk sales in Punjab for all dairy farmers in sample 
 
In 2008 
% of dairy farmers in  
sample (N=710) 
In 2015 
% of dairy farmers in 
sample (N=676) 
A. Cooperative 22.1% 18.5% 
B. Private companies 38.9% 26.9% 
Including:     domestic companies 14.2% 12.6% 
                      foreign (Nestlé)  24.7% 14.4% 
C. Informal channels  13.5% 25.7% 
Including:      households 2.3% 10.2% 
                       informal milk traders 11.3% 15.5% 
D. No Sales  25.5% 29.1% 
Source: Survey data 
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Table 2. 
Main channels of milk sales in Andhra Pradesh for all dairy farmers in sample 
 
In 2010 
% of dairy farmers in  
sample (N=729) 
In 2016 
% of dairy farmers in  
sample (N=505) 
A. Cooperative 31.8% 29.5% 
B. Private domestic firm 17.0% 22.6% 
C. Informal channels  29.2% 32.1% 
Including:      households 7.0% 8.3% 
                       informal milk traders 22.2% 23.8% 
D. No Sales  21.9% 15.8% 
Source: Survey data 
3 Data 
Our study uses data from a two-round household survey conducted in two important but quite different 
states of India: Punjab and AP. The first round of the Punjab data was collected in the summer of 2008 
and the follow-up round seven years later in 2015 during the same period. The first round of the AP data 
was collected between April and June 2010 and the follow-up round six years later in 2016 during the 
same period. Thus, in both states the first round covers the period before most of the FSSA regulations 
were implemented, while the second round covers the period after the new policies were put in place.  
In both survey rounds, the same questionnaire was administered. We collected detailed information on 
milk production practices, particularly on the adoption and implementat ion of different types of food 
standards related to milk hygiene and storage practices at the farm level. The data also include 
information on general household characteristics, including other income generating activities and 
expenditures, productive assets, and living standards. The final sample used for this analysis is a balanced 
panel data set containing 870 households for Punjab and 928 households for AP. 2 
4 Changes in farm-level practices affecting the safety and quality of dairy products 
We focus on two indicators that capture the implementation of food safety standards at the farm level. 
They are hygienic practices (before, during and after milking) and storage practices after milking.  
4.1 Hygienic practices at the farm 
To capture the changes in hygienic practices in a single indicator, we calculated an index of hygienic 
practices (or “hygiene index”), which is measured as the average of the compliance levels for various 
sanitary practices summarized in Table A1 in the appendix 2 (panel A) for Punjab and Table A2 in the 
appendix 2 (panel A) for AP.3 
Figure 2 illustrates the improvement in hygienic practices across all households by the rightward shift of the 
distribution of the hygiene index from 2008 to 2015 in Punjab. The rightward shift of the distribution of the 
hygiene index in AP is less pronounced (Figure 3). 
 
                                                 
2 A more detailed description of the data collection is provided in the Appendix 1.  
3 In Table A1 panel A, answer categories are ranked from least hygienic to most hygienic practice (best practice). In all 
cases, 0 means no compliance. Some indicators (e.g. mode of washing) allow for intermediate categories which signal 
partial compliance with best practices. To obtain the degree of compliance for each practice, we divide the rank of the 
answer category by the total number of answer options minus 1. This gives us a number between 0 and 1 for each hygienic 
practice. We assign equal weights to each practice and therefore obtain the index by taking the average of the compliance 
levels for the individual indicators. 




Figure 2. Distribution of hygiene index in 2008 and 2015 in Punjab 




Figure 3. Distribution of hygiene index in 2010 and 2016 in Andhra Pradesh 
Source: Survey data 
 
In fact, the hygiene index improvement of 0.06 in AP is considerably less than the 0.17 increase in Punjab. 
While the average index of both states was close in 2010 (0.51 and 0.53) it had widened significantly by 
2016 at 0.57 compared to 0.70. 
4.2 Storage practices at the farm 
Minimizing the time between milking and cooling the milk is one of the critical quality bottlenecks. 
Interestingly, the survey data suggest that there has not been a significant improvement in these practices 
between the first and second surveys in both Punjab and AP.   
In Punjab, the methods of milk preservation before sale did not change much between 2008 and 2015 
(see Table A1 panel B). Notably, only 5.1% in 2008 and 7.9% in 2015 cooled the milk before selling. 
However, most households market their milk almost immediately after milking—the average milk storage 
time on the farm was only 19 minutes in both 2008 and 2015.  
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Buyers thus receive raw milk soon after milking, which gives them the opportunity to cool (or boil) the 
milk and contain the growth of microorganisms.  
In AP, storage practices worsened between 2010 and 2016. In 2016, milk was preserved (inside or outside 
the house) for an average of 28.4 minutes before sale, which is much longer than the 17.6 minutes in 
2010 (see Table A2 in the appendix 2, panel B). In addition, more households stored the milk outside their 
house in 2016 (11.3%), which is generally less clean and less cool, increasing the risk of spoilage and 
contamination of the milk.  
5 Dairy value chains and safety and quality standards: Econometric analysis 
To understand the potential causal relationship between participation in various marketing channels  and 
an index of hygienic practices, we turn to econometric analysis.  The great majority of studies on value 
chain participation rely on cross-sectional data, which poses a number of methodological issues. Our 
unique panel data set allows us to address some of these caveats by estimating a fixed effects (FE) model 4 
and thereby eliminating bias stemming from time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The core equation 
is specified as: 
     yi,t = i + Ci,t + HSi,t + Xi,t + Yt + i,t     (1) 
where yi,t is the hygiene index for household i at time t,  is the individual household intercept, Ci,t is a 
set of marketing channel dummies, HSi,t is a vector of variables related to farm size and income, Xi,t is a 
vector of other socioeconomic household characteristics, Yt is a year dummy (taking the value of one for 
2015 for Punjab sample and 2016 for AP sample regressions) and finally i,t is the error term. The 
summary statistics of the main variables used can be found in Table 5.  
First, the vector of dummies, which capture marketing channels, are added to assess the primary 
objective of this chapter: the impact of specific value chains on the implementation of hygienic practices 
at farm level. HSi,t includes herd size, amount of land owned and an asset index, which can all reflect the 
capacity of the households and extent of the implementation of hygienic practices. We expect farmers 
who expanded their herd sizes to be more likely to have adopted improved hygienic practices, although 
the opposite is also plausible. In the absence of sufficient labor, an increase in herd size might lead t o less 
time or effort exerted to implement hygienic practices. Physical capital in the form of land owned (in 
acres) and an index capturing non-land asset ownership may reflect the capacity of households to invest 
in the implementation of improved hygienic practices.  
Furthermore, we include a control vector with time-variant household variables Xi,t that may influence 
adherence to hygienic practices such as age, gender and education of the household head as well as 
household size. Compliance with food safety measures at farm level is found to be labor intensive (Kumar 
et al., 2011). Therefore, we also control for the number of household members over 55 as well as the 
number of female adults. Anecdotal evidence suggests that elderly and female members of the  
households are traditionally assigned to take care of the animals (Janssen and Swinnen, 2019). 
Additionally, we include a dummy indicating whether the household head changed between the two 
rounds of survey to pick up potential changes in management of dairy activities. A year dummy  was 
included to capture all temporal variation between the two rounds of survey, such as weather shocks and 
price variations. To deal with serial correlation and heteroscedasticity, we use robust standard errors a nd 
cluster them at the household level. 
                                                 
4 Regarding reverse causality, we follow the argumentation widely used in the value chain literature (Bellemare, 2012; 
Bellemare and Novak, 2017; Sutradhar et al., 2019) that it is more likely that a household’s choice of marketing channel is 
driven by the prospect of future benefits that could be derived from participation in a certain marketing channel. Another 
potential source of endogeneity is the possibility of the non-random selection of farmers by the processors. One should 
consider processors’ choices regarding their decisions to source the milk from the household, or else there is a danger of 
omitted variables problem that would bias the estimates. However, most of the literature argues that even if processing 
firms discriminate against certain types of farmers they are most likely to do so on the basis of observables rather than 
unobservable factors; our vector of observable factors will most likely hold more information (both observable and 
unobservable) than processors can have access to (Bellemare, 2012; Bellemare and Novak, 2017; Sutradhar et al., 2019). It 
is also unlikely that the variable of interest—participation in a certain marketing channel—suffers from a systematic 
measurement error that would bias our estimation in the FE specification. To our observation, households are well aware of 
the marketing channels they sell to and have little incentive to misreport.  
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5.1 Results and discussion 
Estimation results for our preferred specification (FE) of equation (1) for both regions are presented in 
Table 6. Econometric analysis confirms our descriptives and reveals no clear patte rns in the relationship 
between marketing channels and farm-level hygienic practices. For Punjab, the econometric analysis 
shows that selling to Nestlé is associated with a 9% increase in the average household’s index of hygienic 
practices (i.e., 0.055/0.61, given that the average hygiene index in the Punjab sample is equal to 0.61). 
However, as there was a 40% increase in hygiene index across the entire sample from 2008 to 2015, 
captured by the year dummy, this differentiation is rather small. The temporal  effect captured by the year 
dummy is significant and positive for both states, although in AP the effect is smaller than in Punjab, with 
only an 11% increase in the average household’s hygiene index across the entire sample. Interestingly, in 
AP, selling to informal milk traders is associated with an 11.6% increase in the average household’s 
hygiene index (i.e., 0.063/0.54, given the average hygiene index in AP is equal to 0.54). One explanation is 
selling to informal markets could be associated with more liability and higher reputation costs compared 
to selling to numerous private firms and cooperatives where milk is collected into one big batch.  
We also run additional OLS regressions5 to test for “convergence”. We run two separate regressions to 
disentangle two different mechanisms. In the first one, we look at the households that remained with the 
same buyer. Buyers might have had more time to work with households that remained with them for an 
extended period. In the second regression, we add a set of dummies to identify households that switched 
to specific value chains. Switching to another marketing channel might require changes in hygienic 
practices. To test for convergence amongst households in adhering to better hygienic practices, we 
include the hygiene index of 2008 for Punjab and 2010 for AP. At the village level, we control for both 
village population and distance to the nearest city, as they reflect demand for milk and access to 
information and inputs, such as detergent. Finally, we control for district-level effects stemming from 
local differences in income, policy measures and market access, by including a set of district dummies. To 
deal with heteroscedasticity, we use robust standard errors and cluster them at the village level.  
The results are presented in Tables A5 (appendix 2) and A6 (appendix 2) for both Punjab and AP in 
separate columns. Hygienic improvements do not seem to be associated with specific value chains. There 
are some minor results which do not indicate a clear pattern. In Punjab, households that continued selling 
informally to other households improved the most, while those that switched to selling informally 
improved the least. In AP, those households that stayed with the informal milk traders improved more 
than other households. 
The regression analysis also confirms the convergence in hygienic practices for both Punjab and AP. 
Households with better hygienic practices in 2008 for Punjab and 2010 for AP improved less than those 
with lower hygiene index scores. Interestingly, in Punjab, households with older heads improved the most 
among both those that stayed with and those that switched value chains. One explanation is that age of 
the household head is a proxy for experience. Therefore, older farmers might find it easier to imp lement 
better hygienic practices. In AP, bigger households improved more than the rest among those that stayed 
with the same value chains. This could be due to more family labor that is available to implement more 
and/or better hygienic practices before, during and after milking. 
In summary, despite considerable improvement in the adoption of hygienic practices in Punjab, and to a 
lesser extent in AP, it is not associated with specific value chains. There is little difference in the way 
different value chains interact with farmers. Dairy companies and traders focus mostly on investing in 
collection centers close to the farmers to minimize time between milking and cooling. Tables A1 and A2 
also show that very little information on clean milk production was provided by milk buyers (only 2.5% of 
farmers in Punjab in 2015 and 1.2% of farmers in AP in 2016 received information). Safety and quality 
inspections were also still equally limited: only 2% of households in Punjab and 0.4% in AP reported on -
farm inspections by milk buyers or government institutions.  
One reason for the lack of value chain involvement in promoting improved hygienic practices could be 
that the Food Safety Act has been poorly implemented (CAG, 2017). As a result, dairy processors may not 
have found the investment in training, inspections, or promoting complementary standards 
worthwhile.  Furthermore, as farmers are free to switch between milk buyers at any time, these 
investments are not guaranteed to benefit the milk processor in the long run. 
                                                 
5 The econometric specification is as follows: yi =  + Ci + CVi + HSi + Xi + Vi + i     (2) 
where yi is the change in hygiene index for household i between the two surveys, Ci is a set of marketing channel 
dummies, CVi is a convergence variable, HSi is a vector of variables related to farm size and income, Xi is a vector of other 
socioeconomic household characteristics, Vi is a set of village-level variables and finally i is the error term. 
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The variation in the results between Punjab and AP could be due to a combination of factors including 
profound differences in the structures of the two dairy markets. Many have pointed to Punjab’s 
comparative advantage over AP in terms of dairy production, including climatic conditions, infrastructure, 
higher standards of living, and extensive government support (Chand, 1999; Staal et al., 2008). Dairy farm 
sizes are somewhat larger in Punjab than in the rest of India: 39% of dairy farmers had less than 2  ha of 
land, while the number increases to 69% for India as a whole (Kumar et al., 2011a). AP is a more populous 
and poorer state in the south of India. Dairy production in AP is driven by smallholders and landless poor, 
who own approximately 80% of the state’s livestock population (Animal Husbandry Department 
Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2010).  
The presence of multinational companies such as Nestlé in Punjab, and their absence in AP, the 
emergence of large modern dairy farms in Punjab6 and the lack of such dynamics in AP, all reflect these 
differences and the level of maturity in these two markets in general. The presence of foreign direct 
investment in the domestic markets (in the form of a multinational in the case of Punjab) usually has great 
spillover effects in the form of technology diffusion. This has often occurred in newly emerging dairy 
markets where, due to employee turnover and learning effects, domestic companies have started to 
adopt strategies used by foreign companies (e.g. providing credit,  milking machinery, training, etc.). This 
technology diffusion might have taken place not only through companies but through the emerging class 
of new modern large farmers in Punjab. These modern dairy farms could represent farmer leaders and 
innovators, who serve as important nodes of technology adoption among the wider population of 
traditional farmers. This is consistent with the literature on technology adoption through social learning, 
and social networking (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 2010; Genius et al., 2013; Moser and 
Barrett, 2006; Munshi, 2004). Although we can only speculate as to the extent of this pathway, based on 
our survey we indeed see a pattern where farmers were receiving an increasing amount of information on 
better hygienic practices from other farmers.  
Despite significant improvements, there still appears to be a lot of room for improvement with respect to 
both on-farm hygienic practices and milk storage. Likewise, milk buyers could increase their provision of 
information. 
6 Conclusion  
Dairy products are a major part of Indian diets and milk production is a major production activity for many 
poor Indian farmers. Coupled with strong growth in dairy production and consumption in India over the 
past two decades, the introduction of the FSSA in the early 2010s was expected to transform India’s dairy 
sector. Using two rounds of household survey data, this paper found that changes in public food safety 
standards did not lead to the emergence of complementary private standards i n the dairy sector. 
Although considerable improvements in hygienic practices occurred in Punjab, and to a lesser extent in 
AP, these improvements were not due to participation in specific value chains or closer vertical 
coordination. Low provision of information and lack of on-farm inspections were observed in both 
regions. Higher improvements in on-farm hygienic practices in Punjab compared to AP were more likely a 
result of a combination of factors including better climatic conditions, higher standards of  living and the 
emergence of large modern dairy farms. Ultimately, there is still significant room for farmers to further 
improve their on-farm hygienic practices and dairy companies to increase their provision of information.  
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Appendix 1 
More detailed description of the data collection process 
For the survey in 2008, Punjab was divided into five regions: the north-west (Amritsar and Gurdaspur), the 
north-east (Hoshiarpur, Jalandhar, Kapurthala and Nawanshahar), the south-west (Bathinda, Faridkot, 
Ferozepur, Moga and Muktsar), the south-east (Mansa, Patiala and Sangrur), and the central region 
(Fatehgarh Sahib, Ludhiana and Ropar). In order to avoid oversampling of households in smaller districts, 
one district was selected at random in each region, with the probability of selection being proportional to 
the district’s population share within that region. All villages in these districts were stratified according to 
the marketing channels operating in that area, based on their appearance in a list of procurement villages 
provided by Nestlé, respective milk unions if available, and otherwise on their proximity to cooperative 
sector cooling plants. We selected at random 15 “Nestlé villages”, 15 “cooperative villages”, five villages 
where both companies were expected to operate, and 15 villages where none of them were expected to 
operate. These 50 villages were spread over the five selected districts, resulting in a final selection of six 
villages in the district of Amritsar, six in Hoshiarpur, 14 in Ludhiana, 18 in Ferozepur, and six in Mansa. In 
each village, 20 households were stratified and randomly sampled using a prior village census. Households 
were categorized based on the number of DA they owned (0 DA; 1–2 DA; 3–10 DA; >10 DA) and their 
marketing channel. This sampling strategy allowed for oversampling of Nestlé and cooperativ e suppliers 
and large- and medium-size dairy farmers (as the majority of milk suppliers in Punjab have fewer than 3 
DA) and to extrapolate to the level of Punjab, using the appropriate weighing factors.  
For the survey in 2010, AP was subdivided into four zones based on milk production per rural capita and 
dairy production systems, which may correlate with weather and relative humidity conditions. Within 
each region, one district was sampled at random. In the selected districts, 50 rural villages were rando mly 
selected7. In each village, a census was organized to record the number of DA each household owned to 
classify households into four categories. Households were categorized based on the number of DA they 
owned (0 DA; 1–2 DA; 3–5 DA; >5 DA). A fixed number of households was selected from each strata, so as 
to oversample households with larger herd sizes and obtain a set of 20 households per village.  
For the second survey rounds, we were able to resurvey 90% of the households for the two states: 130 
households (13%) in Punjab and 71 households (7%) in AP were not located. While the reasons for their 
resettlement are unknown, statistical analysis showed that the relocated households were no different 
from those households that were retraced. The final sample used for this analysis is a balanced panel 
containing 870 households for Punjab and 928 households for AP.  
 
                                                 
7 Of which 7 in Chittoor, 12 in Cuddapah, 16 in Kurnool, and 15 in Guntur from the district-level list of villages which was 
obtained from the Government of AP (Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2009). 











 Panel A: Hygienic practices 
  
 Cleaning hands 
 Are the hands washed?   
Never 2.8% 0.5% 
Only before milking 38.5% 36.9% 
In between 58.7% 62.1% 
 Mode of washing hands   
No hand washing 2.8% 0.5% 
Water only 83.6% 42.7% 
Use soap/detergent/disinfectant 13.5% 56.8% 
 Hands dried with paper/cloth before milking?   
Yes 25.5% 66.4% 
 Cleaning of udder and teats   
 Washed before milking?   
No washing 11.8% 4.6% 
Water only 83.9% 90.2% 
Cold water + soap/detergent/disinfectant 3.4% 5.4% 
Dried with paper/cloth before milking?   
Yes 14.2% 23.4% 
 Cleaning of milk utensils   
 How are milk utensils washed?   
Water only 80.4% 14.1% 
Water + soap/detergent/disinfectant 17.4% 79.8% 
Water + sand + ash 0% 6.3% 
 How often are the utensils washed?    
Less than once daily 3.1% 0.14% 
Once daily 20.4% 1.6% 
More than once daily 75.7% 98.3% 
Before milking each new cow/buffalo 0.14% 0.14% 
 Panel B: Food safety practices   
 How long does the milk stay on the farm before sale?  19 min 19.2 min 
 Method of milk preservation before sale   
Not treated 64.2% 61.9% 
Boiling 1.5% 0.9% 
Refrigerating/chilling 5.1% 7.9% 
Other 8.3% 0.14% 
 Panel C: Received information on clean milk production 0.9% 18.6% 
 Sources:    
Other farmers 0% 13.3% 
Government 0.3% 2.4% 
Nestlé 0.4% 1.0% 
Cooperative 0.2% 0.9% 
Veterinary doctor 0% 0.2% 
Informal milk trader 0% 0.4% 
Other 0% 0.4% 
 Received inspection on farm 14.8% 5.2% 
 By:   
Milk buyer 5.6% 0.1% 
Government 6.2% 1.9% 
Other 3.0% 1.0% 
Source: Survey data 
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 Panel A: Hygienic practices   
 Cleaning hands   
 Are the hands washed?   
Never 3.4% 10.9% 
Only before milking 92.2% 84.8% 
In between 4.4% 4.4% 
 Mode of washing hands   
No hand washing 3.8% 5.5% 
Water only 92.2% 85.7% 
Use soap/detergent/disinfectant 4.0% 8.7% 
 Hands dried with paper/cloth before milking?   
Yes 22.2% 54.5% 
 Cleaning of udder and teats   
 Washed before milking?   
No washing 4.7% 5.0% 
Water only 94.1% 90.7% 
Cold water + soap/detergent/disinfectant 1.2% 4.4% 
Dried with paper/cloth before milking?   
Yes 25.1% 37.8% 
 Cleaning of milk utensils   
 How are milk utensils washed?   
Water only 58.6% 59.8% 
Water + soap/detergent/disinfectant 31.1% 23.2% 
Water + sand + ash 6.4% 12.9% 
 How often are the utensils washed?   
Less than once daily 9.6% 9.3% 
Once daily 8.0% 3.0% 
Twice daily 58.6% 86.9% 
More than twice daily 23.2% 0.4% 
Before milking each new cow/buffalo 0.7% 0.4% 
   
 Panel B: Food safety practices   
 How long does the milk stay on the farm before sale?  17.6 min 28.4 min 
 Method of milk preservation before sale   
Inside the house 82.9% 77.8% 
Outside the house 4.4% 11.3% 
Other 12.8% 10.9% 
   
 Panel C: Received information on clean milk production  3.3% 3.8% 
 Sources:    
Other farmers 0.1% 0.2% 
Government 1.2% 2.0% 
Private Milk buyer 0.3% 0.2% 
Cooperative 0.4% 1.0% 
Veterinary doctor 0.1% 0.2% 
Other 1.1% 0.2%% 
   
 Received inspection on farm 0.5% 0.8% 
 By:    
Milk buyer 0.1% 0.2% 
Government 0.1% 0.2% 
Other 0.3% 0.4% 
Source: Survey data  




Summary statistics of variables used in econometric analysis by sample year 
a. Punjab 
  2008 sample 2015 sample 
    
Hygiene  Index 0.53 (0.13) 0.69 (0.14) 
Farm size and income      
Total no. of DA No. 4.14 (4.3) 3.52 (4.88) 
Land Acres 8.27 (10.4) 9.77 (13.94) 
Asset index Index 0.31 (0.95) 0.32 (1.00) 
HH characteristics      
Age HH head Years 50.53 (11.99) 54.35 (14.10) 
HH head is female  % 3.0 (17.1) 6.32 (24.36) 
HH head education Years 5.37 (4.60) 7.48 (5.04) 
HH size No. 6.18 (2.58) 5.96 (2.54) 
HH members over 55 No. 0.73 (0.84) 0.95 (0.98) 
No. of female adults in HH No. 2.25 (1.08) 2.17 (1.14) 
Village level HI (excluding self) Index 0.53 (0.09) 0.69 (0.07) 
b. Andhra Pradesh 
  2010 Sample 2016 Sample 
    
Hygiene Index Index 0.50 (0.14) 0.57 (0.12) 
Farm size and income      
Land Acres 4.07 (5.94) 2.28 (3.14) 
Total no. of DA No. 3.43 (2.44) 3.11 (2.56) 
Asset index Index 0.10 (0.99) 0.18 (1.15) 
HH characteristics      
Age HH head Years 47.00 (10.7) 51.95 (11.0) 
HH head is female  % 0.07 (0.25) 0.09 (0.28) 
HH head education Years 3.36 (4.45) 3.96 (4.62) 
HH size No. 5.24 (2.06) 5.03 (1.98) 
HH members over 55 No. 0.50 (0.69) 0.75 (0.91) 
No. of female adults in HH No. 1.64 (0.89) 1.65 (0.92) 
Village level HI (excluding self) Index 0.51 (0.1) 0.57 (0.05) 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. The table is based on all households that had DA in both sample years. 
Source: Survey data 












Supply chain:      
Nestlé 0.055** (0.023)   
Cooperative 0.009 (0.019) 0.039 (0.027) 
Private domestic firm 0.024 (0.022) 0.043 (0.028) 
Informal milk traders 0.028 (0.021) 0.063** (0.028) 
Informally to households -0.003 (0.022) 0.031 (0.035) 
Farm size and income     
Total No. of DA 0.022 (0.020) -0.038* (0.022) 
Land 0.019 (0.013) 0.014 (0.013) 
Asset index -0.040*** (0.010) 0.003 (0.009) 
HH characteristics     
Age HH head -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.002) 
HH head is female 0.045 (0.037) -0.028 (0.048) 
HH head education -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.003) 
HH size -0.002 (0.004) -0.002 (0.007) 
HH members over 55 -0.008 (0.007) 0.004 (0.016) 
No. of female adults in HH 0.007 (0.007) -0.002 (0.013) 
Change HHH -0.026 (0.032) 0.015 (0.028) 
Year 2015 0.185*** (0.012) 0.059*** (0.017) 
Observations 1,359  1,106  
R-squared 0.462  0.134  
Number of hhid 740  734  
Note: (FE) - Fixed effects models. 
Robust standard errors (clustered at individual level) in parentheses *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 













Supply chain: HH stayed in     
Nestlé 0.018 (0.033)   
Cooperative 0.007 (0.033) 0.063 (0.042) 
Private domestic firm -0.031 (0.070) 0.050 (0.060) 
Informal milk traders -0.001 (0.089) 0.098** (0.046) 
Informally to households 0.132*** (0.046) -0.054 (0.189) 
Convergence     
Hygiene Index in 2008 -2.011*** (0.112) -1.991*** (0.112) 
Farm size and income     
Total No. of DA 0.010 (0.024) -0.015 (0.028) 
Land 0.023 (0.016) -0.001 (0.016) 
Asset index -0.013 (0.012) 0.006 (0.013) 
HH characteristics     
Age HH head 0.002* (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
HH head is female -0.008 (0.037) -0.011 (0.051) 
HH head education 0.003 (0.002) -0.001 (0.003) 
HH size 0.003 (0.005) 0.016* (0.009) 
HH members over 55 0.005 (0.013) -0.011 (0.020) 
No. of female adults in HH -0.006 (0.013) -0.020 (0.018) 
Change HHH 0.000 (0.029) 0.011 (0.035) 
Village level indicators     
Total Village population -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Distance to closest town (in 
km) 
0.002 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) 
District fixed effects yes  yes  
Observations 621  433  
R-squared 0.631  0.612  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 












 Supply chain: HH switched to     
 Nestlé -0.015 (0.041)   
 Cooperative -0.029 (0.027) -0.059 (0.045)  
 Private domestic firm -0.048 (0.042) -0.042 (0.038) 
 Informal milk traders 0.002 (0.030) 0.003 (0.068) 
 Informally to households -0.058** (0.024) -0.041 (0.040) 
 Convergence     
 Hygiene Index in 2008 -2.018*** (0.112) -1.975*** (0.111) 
 Farm size and income     
 Total No. of DA 0.009 (0.024) -0.017 (0.029) 
 Land 0.024 (0.015) -0.003 (0.016) 
 Asset index -0.015 (0.013) 0.005 (0.014) 
 HH characteristics     
 Age HH head 0.002* (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
 HH head is female -0.006 (0.035) -0.005 (0.050) 
 HH head education 0.002 (0.002) -0.000 (0.003) 
 HH size 0.003 (0.004) 0.014 (0.009) 
 HH members over 55 0.007 (0.013) -0.006 (0.021) 
 No. of female adults in HH -0.004 (0.012) -0.016 (0.018) 
 Change HHH -0.003 (0.028) 0.015 (0.036) 
 Village level indicators     
 Total Village population -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
 Distance to closest town (in km) 0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 
 District fixed effects yes  yes  
 Observations 621  433  
 R-squared 0.634  0.607  
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
